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The Cost of Sharing and the Common 
Law: How to Address the Negative 
Externalities of Home-Sharing 
Tristan P. Espinosa*
INTRODUCTION
Over the past several years, the “sharing economy” has 
proven more challenging to regulate than perhaps any other 
commercial industry in recent decades. An exact definition of the 
“sharing economy” is hard to pin down, however, the term is 
typically thought to refer to companies that either “(1) own goods 
or services that they rent to consumers on a short-term basis, or 
(2) create peer-to-peer (“P2P”) platforms connecting providers 
and users for short-term exchanges of goods or services.”1 The 
variety of companies that embody the sharing economy are as 
numerous as they are creative, and each presents its own set of 
regulatory needs and challenges. Yet of the companies that 
comprise the “sharing-economy,” the need for regulation is most 
apparent for companies that provide for home-sharing, such as 
Airbnb, Inc., HomeAway, Inc., and Couchsurfing International, 
Inc. Though their respective target demographics differ, each of 
these home-sharing providers are similar in that they create 
digital P2P marketplaces that allow users all over the globe to 
rent and lease empty space in their homes for the short-term.  
While this practice is economically beneficial in a number of 
respects (utilization of an untapped resource, financial gain, 
increased tourism, etc.), oftentimes such benefits come at the 
expense of others.  
When a user of one of the above-referenced home-sharing 
websites lives in a residential neighborhood and lists their 
property as a short-term rental, they are essentially 
commercializing a residential area. Unregulated, this activity 
causes nuisances in single-family-neighborhoods typically 
associated with commercial activities, such as noise, traffic, and 
transients. Such nuisances threaten the integrity of single-family 
 * J.D., Chapman University Dale E. Fowler School of Law, May 2016. 
1 Daniel E. Rauch & David Schleicher, Like Uber, But for Local Governmental 
Policy: The Future of Local Regulation of the “Sharing Economy” 2 (George Mason Law & Econ. 
Research Paper No. 15-01, 2016).
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neighborhoods and the property values of the homes therein, 
causing outrage amongst the residents in the neighborhood who 
chose not to rent out space in their homes. But it is not only 
residential areas that are affected, for even if a user of a 
home-sharing website lists an apartment for rent short-term, 
rather than a single-family-home, harm to the general public still 
results. As one apartment goes up for rent on a home-sharing 
website, one unit of housing disappears from the regular rental 
market.2 In many cities this practice has an exacerbating effect 
on the housing market, causing availability to fall and the cost of 
living to rise.3
Compelled by the threat that home-sharing poses to 
single-family neighborhoods and its negative impact on the 
rental housing market, cities across the United States have 
attempted to regulate digital home-sharing markets.4 These 
regulations are based on traditional, business-to-consumer 
business models and thus target the actual suppliers of 
short-term rentals—those who list properties for rent on 
home-sharing websites—rather than the platform providers, 
i.e. the websites.5 However, because home-sharing websites 
utilize P2P business models, supply of the service is 
decentralized, rendering regulations based on a business-to-
consumer model largely ineffective.6 This is because the 
decentralized nature of home-sharing makes it difficult for 
violators of regulations to be discovered, thereby reducing 
2 See generally L.A. DEP’T OF CITY PLANNING, HOUSING ELEMENT 2013-2021,
CHAPTER 1: HOUSING NEEDS ASSESSMENT (Dec. 3, 2013), http://planning.lacity.org/Housing
Initiatives/HousingElement/Text/Ch1.pdf [http://perma.cc/5MFQ-G5WF]. 
3 Id.
4 To name just a few, San Francisco, Los Angeles, New York, Portland, Chicago, 
and Philadelphia are cities that are currently attempting to regulate home-sharing. See
Marielle Mondon, S.F. Is Struggling to Make Good on Airbnb Regulation, NEXT CITY
(Mar. 25, 2015), http://nextcity.org/daily/entry/san-francisco-airbnb-regulation-problems 
[http://perma.cc/3AJP-FD47]; Robert Holguin, Los Angeles City Leaders Want to Regulate 
Home-Sharing Websites Like Airbnb, KABC EYEWITNESS NEWS (Dec. 5, 2014), 
http://abc7.com/news/la-city-leaders-want-to-regulate-home-sharing-websites-like-airbnb/ 
424126/ [http://perma.cc/WD8Z-KBDD]; Ronda Kaysen, What’s Up Next in New York? 
Airbnb and Rent Regulation Will Be Hot Topics, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 26, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/28/realestate/new-york-airbnb-and-rent-regulation-will-
be-hot-topics.html?_r=0 [http://perma.cc/K23B-2QRT]; Steve Law, Airbnb Resists City 
Efforts to Regulate It, PORTLAND TRIB. (Dec. 18, 2014, 8:14 PM), http://portland
tribune.com/pt/9-news/244479-112102-airbnb-resists-city-efforts-to-regulate-it [http://perma. 
cc/YAB7-P5LH]; Alby Gallun & Ally Marotti, Hotels to Airbnb Hosts: Pay Up, CRAIN’S
CHI. BUS. (Feb. 14, 2015), http://www.chicagobusiness.com/article/20150214/ISSUE01/3021
49989/hotels-to-airbnb-hosts-pay-up [http://perma.cc/MLD6-8FAC]; Mike Dunn, Phila.
Lawmakers Move Toward Regulating, and Taxing, Airbnb Room Rentals, CBS PHILLY
(June 1, 2015, 2:05 PM), http://philadelphia.cbslocal.com/2015/06/01/phila-lawmakers-move-
toward-regulating-and-taxing-airbnb-room-rentals/ [http://perma.cc/J974-GH6V]. 
5 See infra Part II. 
6 Id.
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incentive to comply. Thus in several cases, even where 
regulations prohibit home-sharing in a specific neighborhood or 
area, because there is substantial profit to be made and little 
chance of discovery, home-sharing continues, unabated.7
If regulatory efforts fail, the costs of home-sharing are borne 
by those who are not involved in its practice (“non-sharers”).8 In 
single-family neighborhoods, non-sharer residents continue to 
experience nuisances typically associated with commercial 
activity, resulting in the loss of enjoyment of their property and a 
potential decrease in the monetary value of the property.9 At the 
same time, non-sharer inhabitants of rental dwellings in the city 
continue to experience rent increases, causing the cost of living to 
rise.10 As these problems continue, the number of aggrieved 
parties will grow and the aggregate damages will become 
substantial. As history has shown, once a tipping point is 
reached, a lawsuit will follow—a lawsuit that may just be the 
cost-shifting mechanism needed to address the negative 
externalities caused by home-sharing. 
Based on precedent cases involving P2P business models and 
common-law rules of third-party liability, a class of individual 
landowners may one day bring and win a monumental lawsuit 
against home-sharing websites that will change the way 
home-sharing websites operate within the United States. While 
7 Examples of regulation failure can be observed most clearly in San Francisco and 
Los Angeles. See Emily Alpert Reyes, Los Angeles Gives Hosts, Neighbors Mixed Signals on 
Short-term Rentals, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 7, 2015, 10:00 AM), http://www.latimes.com/ 
local/california/la-me-adv-illegal-rentals-20150208-story.html#page=1 [http://perma.cc/FWJ7-
DYSY]; see also Matt Weinberger, San Francisco Complains It Can’t Enforce Its Own Airbnb 
Law, BUS. INSIDER (Mar. 23, 2015, 4:41 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/san-francisco-
calls-airbnb-regulations-unenforceable-2015-3 [http://perma.cc/F7J6-3VZS]. 
8 See Steven Leigh Morris, Airbnb Is Infuriating the Neighbors. Is It Time for New 
Rules?, L.A. WKLY. (Jan. 22, 2015, 2:47 PM), http://www.laweekly.com/news/airbnb-is-
infuriating-the-neighbors-is-it-time-for-new-rules-5343663 [http://perma.cc/GL67-3ECU]; 
Benjamin Mueller, Hearing Pits Tenants Who Denounce Airbnb Against Those Who Profit 
From It, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 20, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/21/nyregion/ hearing-
pits-tenants-who-denounce-airbnb-against-those-who-profit-from-it.html [http://perma.cc/KC4V- 
8NZM].
9 See Morris, supra note 8; see also Walter Hamilton, Renting Rooms Through 
Airbnb Riles Fellow Homeowners, SEATTLE TIMES (Sept. 19, 2013, 6:56 PM), 
http://www.seattletimes.com/business/renting-rooms-through-airbnb-riles-fellow-homeowners/ 
[http://perma.cc/KL2S-M5AB].  
10 See Daniel Hirsch, Report: Airbnb Cuts into Housing, Should Share Data, MISSION
LOCAL (May 14, 2015, 5:00 PM), http://missionlocal.org/2015/05/report-airbnb-cuts-into-
housing-should-give-up-data/ [http://perma.cc/5TB6-2AUS]; Caroline O’Donovan, The Rent 
Is Too Damn High: In Search of the Truth About Airbnb’s Impact on Housing, BUZZFEED
NEWS (June 9, 2015, 3:59 PM), http://www.buzzfeed.com/carolineodonovan/the-rent-is-too-
damn-high-the-truth-about-airbnbs-impact-on#.mqaP1YmG5 [http://perma.cc/X2ZY-P6LD];
see also Rachel Monroe, More Guests, Empty Houses, SLATE (Feb. 13, 2014, 8:08 AM), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/business/moneybox/2014/02/airbnb_gentrification_how_the
_sharing_economy_drives_up_housing_prices.html [http://perma.cc/H9BM-RR8U]. 
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600 Chapman Law Review [Vol. 19:2
home-sharing is a recent phenomenon, digital P2P markets have 
been around since the late 1990s, and have already been the 
impetus for a pair of pivotal judicial decisions.  
In 1999, a class of recording producers brought suit against 
the infamous Napster Inc.,11 and in 2004, a class of film producers 
brought suit against Grokster Ltd., Napster’s more sophisticated 
cousin.12 Interestingly, the stories of these lawsuits are remarkably 
similar. In each case, a company utilized a business model based 
on digital P2P marketplaces,13 and each company thrived for a 
time, but at the expense of other entities in their respective 
industries. Eventually the costs which had been passed on to the 
other companies in the industry grew so large, it came to a 
tipping point, and a class-action lawsuit was brought. As a 
result, both Napster and Grokster were held accountable for 
the negative externalities each had caused.14 Napster and 
Grokster were then left to either abandon their business for fear 
of future lawsuits, or re-evaluate their business models and 
conceive methods of doing business lawfully. In other words, 
Napster and Grokster were compelled by lawsuits to address 
and mitigate the negative externalities each had caused.  
These cases exemplify how the common law can act as a 
cost-shifting mechanism for the negative externalities of P2P 
markets, and provide a framework outlining more effective 
regulations for home-sharing. Despite the fact that legislative 
regulation fails to shift the costs of harms caused by 
home-sharing back onto the companies that create them, the 
costs can still be shifted—and home-sharing can be successfully 
regulated—if a class of plaintiffs successfully brings suit against 
a home-sharing company. Once a lawsuit is successful, 
home-sharing companies will be compelled to re-evaluate their 
business practices and formulate methods of conducting business 
that do not expose the company to liability.   
This Comment is divided into three parts. Part I details two 
of the most common negative externalities caused by 
home-sharing, identifies who bears the costs of those 
externalities, and discusses the legislative attempts by various 
11 See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1011 (9th Cir. 2001). 
12 See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 919 (2005). 
13 Id.; see also supra note 11. 
14 See Ron Harris, Napster Offers $1 Billion Settlement, ABC NEWS (Feb. 20, 2001), 
http://abcnews.go.com/Technology/story?id=98832 [http://perma.cc/DUY6-KBWA]; see also 
Ben Fritz, Grokster Plays Nice by Turning Radio Dial, VARIETY (Nov. 15, 2004, 3:56 PM), 
http://variety.com/2004/biz/markets-festivals/grokster-plays-nice-by-turning-radio-dial-111 
7913569/ [http://perma.cc/CFZ6-LYKR]; John Borland, Last Waltz for Grokster, CNET 
(May 30, 2006, 11:10 AM), http://www.cnet.com/news/last-waltz-for-grokster/ [http://perma.cc/ 
J7AU-EJMC].
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2016] The Cost of Sharing and the Common Law 601 
municipalities to address them. Part II explains why legislative 
attempts to address negative externalities of home-sharing are 
ineffective. Part III then offers how, based on precedent P2P 
cases and common law rules of private nuisance and third-party 
liability, the common law is an adequate mechanism for shifting 
the costs of the negative externalities of home-sharing onto the 
companies that create them, so that these companies may finally 
be successfully regulated.
I. THE NEGATIVE EXTERNALITIES OF HOME-SHARING
Generally speaking, a negative externality is an indirect cost 
of a commercial activity that is borne by society or bystanders 
outside of the industry rather than the commercial enterprise or 
individuals conducting the activity.15 The number of negative 
externalities that result from the unregulated, wide-spread practice 
of short-term renting made possible by home-sharing websites 
are numerous and substantial. However, there are two 
externalities in particular that are most common in cities across 
the United States: the negative effect of wide-spread 
home-sharing on residential neighborhoods, and the negative 
effect of wide-spread home-sharing on the rental housing market.  
A.  The Effect of Home-Sharing on Residential Neighborhoods 
Los Angeles, California has experienced nearly all of the 
negative externalities associated with home-sharing on residential 
areas given the density and high cost of living. As is the case in 
many Los Angeles areas, home-sharing is a popular practice in 
the neighborhood of Silver Lake.16 In 2013, Silver Lake was the 
location of at least 200 listings for short-term rentals on 
Airbnb.com, ranging from studio apartments for $60 per night, to 
entire homes complete with swimming pools for $425 per night.17
Yet despite the numerous home-sharers in the area, many 
residents were strongly opposed (“non-sharers”) to the practice of 
home-sharing in their neighborhood. In fact, the non-sharers of 
Silver Lake were so opposed to home-sharing that they 
eventually petitioned their local government to enact an outright 
ban on short-term renting through home-sharing websites like 
Airbnb.com in the neighborhood.18
15 Thomas Helbling, What Are Externalities?, FIN. & DEV. (December 2010), 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2010/12/pdf/basics.pdf [http://perma.cc/783F-2JNW]. 
16 Will Airbnb Have to Check Out of Silver Lake?, EASTSIDER (Aug. 14, 2013), 
http://www.theeastsiderla.com/2013/08/will-airbnb-have-to-check-out-of-silver-lake/ [http:// 
perma.cc/3KG3-8SQA].
17 Id.
18 Id.
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Non-sharers in Silver Lake opposed home-sharing with as 
much vigor and animosity as they would the development of a 
commercial short-term rental establishment such as a hotel or 
inn. They asserted that the “hotel-like room rentals,” made 
available by home-sharing websites like Airbnb.com “bring 
transients, traffic,” and “create potential safety issues.”19 These 
are legitimate concerns for homeowners because property values 
are typically higher in quieter, secluded, crime-free areas.20 But 
when land is put to commercial use, such as a hotel or retail 
store, the noise and traffic levels of the area increase as a result 
of people coming and going, and the transient nature of the 
establishment can increase the crime rate.21 Thus, by their nature, 
commercial uses in residential areas cause the values of the 
surrounding residential properties to fall, and the loss of value is 
borne by the residents, not the home-sharing websites.22
In an effort to mitigate the negative impact of home-sharing 
on the neighborhood and restore their properties to their original 
perceived value, the non-sharers of Silver Lake petitioned the 
neighborhood council to pass a resolution that would ban all 
short-term rentals within the neighborhood.23 At a meeting to 
discuss the resolution, more than 150 residents of Silver Lake 
appeared.24 While there were plenty of non-sharers present to 
bemoan the parking shortages, increased transients, and 
excessive noise caused by home-sharing,25 also present at the 
hearing were members of “Peers,” an Airbnb lobbyist group 
whose self-proclaimed mission is “to grow the sharing economy, 
to mainstream it, to tell its story, and to protect it.”26 Ultimately, 
the non-sharers were outnumbered by the Peers, and the resolution 
to ban short-term renting on home-sharing websites did not pass.27
19 Id.
20 Mandi Woodruff, 9 Things That Will Trash Your Home’s Value, BUS. INSIDER
(May 13, 2013, 9:30 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/what-hurts-home-value-2013-
5?op=1 [http://perma.cc/N2CY-EX35].  
21 See generally John M. Quigley & Larry A. Rosenthal, The Effects of Land Use 
Regulation on the Price of Housing: What Do We Know? What Can We Learn?, 8 
CITYSCAPE: 1 J. POL’Y DEV. & RES. 69 (2005), https://www.huduser.gov/periodicals/cityscpe/ 
vol8num1/ch3.pdf [http://perma.cc/GXF7-8YGA].  
22 Id.
23 Neal Broverman, Silver Lakers Want to Ban Airbnb Rentals in Their 
Neighborhood, CURBED L.A. (Aug. 14, 2013, 6:16 PM), http://la.curbed.com/archives/2013/ 
08/silver_lakers_want_to_ban_airbnb_rentals_in_their_neighborhood.php [http://perma.cc/ 
N7Y6-XKYN]. 
24 Zak Stone, The Battle Over Airbnb Moves to Los Angeles, CO.EXIST (Sept. 17, 2013, 
8:23 AM), http://www.fastcoexist.com/3017486/the-battle-over-airbnb-moves-to-los-angeles
[http://perma.cc/LYU4-3YTM]. 
25 Id.
26 Id.
27 Id.
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Regardless of who won the battle of Silver Lake, it is clear that 
unregulated home-sharing has a costly impact on residential 
communities. Similar disputes over whether home-sharing should 
be regulated have taken place not only in other neighborhoods 
throughout California such as Venice and West Hollywood, but 
also in cities across the United States including New Orleans, 
Louisiana, and Portland, Oregon.28 Thus, it would seem that no 
matter the city, widespread unregulated home-sharing brings 
nuisances to residential areas, thereby lowering the values of all 
homes in the neighborhood, and leading non-sharers to demand 
regulation. While the story of Silver Lake demonstrates that, for 
the time being, non-sharers are in the minority, this does not 
change the fact that the cost of the degradation of the 
neighborhood is borne by residents who do not participate in 
home-sharing.  
B.  Pressure on Housing Market 
In addition to the costs that home-sharing places on 
non-sharing homeowners in single-family neighborhoods, the 
proliferation of home-sharing also generates costs for renters.29
Home-sharing websites reduce traditional barriers to entry into 
the hotel industry, and thus, more and more landlords and 
leasing companies are converting long-term rental units into 
permanent short-term rental units or de facto hotels.30 As a result, 
the number of rental units available on the market is falling, and 
the market is shrinking.31 Such shrinkage has an exacerbating 
effect on the high cost of living in dense areas such as San 
Francisco, New York City, and Los Angeles.32 But just like the 
cost of lowered property values in single-family neighborhoods, 
this higher cost of living is borne by those who do not participate 
in home-sharing.  
28 See Stevie St. John, Airbnb Is Raising the Ire of WeHo Apartment Managers and 
Tenants, WEHOVILLE (Mar. 14, 2014), http://www.wehoville.com/2014/03/14/airbnb-
raising-ire-weho-apartment-managers-tenants/ [http://perma.cc/CNE5-AYVK]; see also
Juliet Bennett Rylah, WeHo Might Ban Airbnb, LAIST (Feb. 4, 2015, 1:15 PM), http:// 
laist.com/2015/02/04/weho_considers_banning_airbnb.php [http://perma.cc/U5U7-8N9A]; 
Robert McClendon, Battle Brewing over Short-Term Rentals, as Residents Discuss Airbnb,
TIMES-PICAYUNE (May 20, 2014, 9:51 PM),  http://www.nola.com/politics/index.ssf/2014/05/ 
battle_brewing_over_bed_and_br.html [http://perma.cc/H34E-K28M]; Elliot Njus, 
Portland Tries to Make Peace with Airbnb as ‘Sharing Economy’ Moves into the 
Mainstream, OREGONIAN (Jan. 31, 2014, 5:18 AM), http://www.oregonlive.com/ front-
porch/index.ssf/2014/01/airbnb-style_vacation_rentals.html [http://perma.cc/7WTK-CRP7]. 
29 See L.A. DEP’T OF CITY PLANNING, supra note 2. 
30 See generally Denise Cheng, Is Sharing Really Caring? A Nuanced Introduction to 
the Peer Economy, OPEN SOC’Y FOUND. (Oct. 2014), http://static.opensocietyfoundations. 
org/misc/future-of-work/the-sharing-economy.pdf [http://perma.cc/4VRE-E2PK]. 
31 See Hirsch, supra note 10; O’Donovan, supra note 10. 
32 See L.A. DEP’T OF CITY PLANNING, supra note 2, at 1–3.
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In some respects, the practice of home-sharing is fairly 
consistent with the practice of running a hotel. Generally 
speaking, the success of any given hotel can be attributed to its 
reputation and visibility.33 Hotels spend hundreds of thousands 
of dollars on amenities and employees in order to gain the 
reputation of a clean, comfortable, and safe hotel.34 In addition, 
hotels spend significant sums of money on advertising in order to 
increase visibility and draw guests. Successful home-sharing 
relies on similar techniques. Just like a hotel, home-sharers must 
establish their reputation, and then advertise their short-term 
rental properties in order to draw guests. But where hotels have 
money to spend on amenities and advertising, the average 
homeowner or renter does not.  
If in fact a homeowner or renter had a spare room and was 
willing to rent it short-term, the search for a short-term tenant 
could be challenging and ineffective. Advertising for the room 
would be done either on community bulletin boards, newspapers, 
or word-of-mouth. Granted, the emergence of Craigslist made 
advertising easier and more effective (as anyone with an internet 
connection gained the ability to broadcast an advertisement 
capable of reaching unlimited viewers), but as the breadth of the 
advertisement increased, so did the risk for hosts and guests.35
Once the advertisement spreads beyond the scope of the 
neighborhood, would-be hosts and guests have no way to vet one 
another.36 Therefore, prior to the recent rise of home-sharing 
websites, for most prospective home-sharers advertising a 
residential property as a short-term rental either failed to reach 
enough prospective guests or it posed an unacceptable degree of 
risk, and thus home-sharing occurred on a much smaller scale.37
33 See generally Pedro Colaco, 10 Success Tips on Online Visibility for Independent 
Hotels, HOTEL BUS. REV., http://hotelexecutive.com/business_review/2120/10-success-tips-on-
online-visibility-for-independent-hotels [http://perma.cc/DAP9-UKT5]; Vanessa Horwell, 
How to Market Your Hotel Today for Success Tomorrow, HOTEL BUS. REV.,
http://hotelexecutive.com/business_review/2139/how-to-market-your-hotel-today-for-success- 
tomorrow [http://perma.cc/4EBE-THMJ]. 
 34 See Sam Trotter, How Much Does it Cost to Build a Hotel – 2015, BOUTIQUE
HOSPITALITY MGMT. (Feb. 11, 2015), http://www.boutique-hospitality.com/how-much-does-
it-costs-to-build-a-hotel-2015/ (stating midscale hotels spend on average $95,600 on 
building and site improvements; full service hotels spend roughly $193,600; and luxury 
hotels and resorts spend roughly $392,600) [https://perma.cc/3VJB-3L26]. 
35 David C. Wyld, Renter Beware: Craigslist is Fast Becoming the Go-to Site for 
Rental Property, But the Lack of Trustworthiness Makes the Prospect of Renting Via the 
Internet a Very Risky Proposition Indeed, WEB.ARCHIVE (June 7, 2012) https:// 
web.archive.org/web/20160115133914/https://www.escrow.com/news/Articles/craigslist_is_ 
fast_becoming_the_go-to_site_for_rental_property/16 [http://perma.cc/WP2H-W5HM]. 
36 Id.
37 Airbnb in the City, N.Y. ST. OFF. ATT’Y GEN. (Oct. 2014), http://www.ag.ny.gov/pdfs/ 
Airbnb%20report.pdf [http://perma.cc/BZD3-7ZXY]. 
37838-chp_19-2 Sheet No. 133 Side A      05/09/2016   12:16:02
37838-chp_19-2 Sheet No. 133 Side A      05/09/2016   12:16:02
C M
Y K
Do Not Delete 5/6/16 1:57 PM 
2016] The Cost of Sharing and the Common Law 605 
Presently, however, home-sharing websites like Airbnb.com 
have essentially eliminated these problems, thereby greatly 
reducing traditional barriers to entry to the hotel/home-sharing 
industry for individuals and commercial enterprises alike. Through 
user rating systems, home-sharing websites like Airbnb.com create 
a substitute for trust that reduces the risk of home-sharing for 
both hosts and guests.38 Hosts can see which guests have the 
highest reputations as respectful guests, and guests can see 
which hosts have the best reputation for providing well-kept 
rooms and amenities.39 This manufactured trust drastically 
reduces costs for homeowners seeking to list their property for 
rent, as their reputation becomes established through user reviews.  
The cost of advertising is likewise eliminated, as home-sharing 
websites make it possible for home-sharers to be globally visible 
for free.40 Through their sophisticated user interfaces, home-sharing 
websites allow any listed property to be viewed by any potential 
guest at any time when they use the website’s search function. 
Thus, the user who seeks to rent out space in his or her home 
need not invest any more in advertising than the cost of a few 
pictures. Accordingly, home-sharing websites have substantially 
reduced the cost of entry into the home-sharing/hotel industry for 
both individuals seeking to self-employ, and commercial entities 
seeking to establish de facto hotels.41
Lower barriers to entry to the hotel industry result in 
conversion of residential units into rental accommodations on a 
much larger scale than ever before.42 For instance, in Los Angeles 
(and in other cities as well) whole units, as opposed to a spare 
bedroom within a unit or a shared unit, dominate the listings on 
home-sharing websites.43 Of all the Airbnb listings in Los Angeles, 
sixty-four percent are for entire units, while thirty-two percent 
are for private rooms, and four percent are for shared rooms.44 Of 
the entire-unit listings, six percent are rented out by what can be 
classified as “leasing companies,” which are property owners that 
38 See generally Wyld, supra note 35. 
39 Cheng, supra note 30, at 5. 
40 See generally How It Works, AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com/help/getting-started/ 
how-it-works [http://perma.cc/Z48L-SLJ6]. 
41 Cheng, supra note 30, at 17. 
42 Id.; see also Tim Logan, Emily Alpert Reyes & Ben Poston, Airbnb and Other 
Short-Term Rentals Worsen Housing Shortage, Critics Say, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 11, 2015, 
3:00 AM), http://www.latimes.com/business/realestate/la-fi-airbnb-housing-market-2015 
0311-story.html#page=1 [http://perma.cc/HBC7-WNTQ]. 
43 See Roy Samaan, Airbnb, Rising Rent, and the Housing Crisis in Los Angeles,
LAANE: A NEW ECONOMY FOR ALL (Mar. 2015), http://www.laane.org/wp-content/ 
uploads/2015/03/AirBnB-Final.pdf [http://perma.cc/6C6J-E737]. 
44 Id. at 18. 
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list two or more whole units at a time.45 While these leasing 
companies represent a minority share of the market, they actually 
account for thirty-five percent of all the revenue generated by 
Airbnb in Los Angeles.46
Global Homes and Condos (“Global”) is one such leasing 
company. Global describes itself as “a full service vacation rental 
management company,”47 and is known as “the most prolific 
host” in Los Angeles, listing at least seventy-eight whole units as 
short-term rentals on home-sharing websites in a cluster that 
spans the border between Santa Monica and Venice.48 By using 
home-sharing websites, Global is able to pit “tourist dollars 
against rental dollars,” and consistently finds that it can 
generate significantly more revenue by converting its long-term 
rental stock into short-term rental listings on home-sharing 
websites than if it were to lease the properties long term.49
Meanwhile, the city of Los Angeles suffers from a deficit of 
rental housing, needing an additional 5300 units of rental 
housing per year to meet demand.50 The Mayor and City Council 
of Los Angeles are currently working to make the availability of 
rental housing a priority by requiring developers to set aside 
units for affordable housing in exchange for permitting other 
development. The City is also working to preserve the number of 
rental housing units on the market by “adopting a ‘no net loss’ 
policy that ensures subsidized units don’t disappear when 
buildings are demolished or replaced.”51 Measures like these 
demonstrate that the City is spending tax dollars and other 
municipal resources to not only ensure that new units of rental 
housing will be added to the market, but current units will 
remain available. Entities like Global, however, which make 
commercial use of home-sharing websites, directly hinder the 
City’s goal of keeping rental housing units on the market, and 
the City (i.e. taxpayers and renters) pays the costs in two ways.52
First, as more long-term rental units are converted into 
permanently listed short-term rentals, the cost of living in the 
45 Id.
46 Id.
47 Id.
48 Id.
49 Id. at 20. 
50 The Times Editorial Board, L.A. Has a Serious Housing Crisis and It’s Time for 
City Officials to Do Something About It, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 11, 2015, 5:00 AM), http://
www.latimes.com/opinion/editorials/la-ed-affordable-housing-part-1-20150111-story.html
[http://perma.cc/N2HK-XG9S]; see also Logan, Reyes & Poston, supra note 42. 
51 The Times Editorial Board, supra note 50.
52 See Tim Logan & Emily Alpert Reyes, Airbnb Cuts Ties with Vacation-Rental 
Firms in Los Angeles, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 3, 2015, 5:41 PM), http://www.latimes.com/ 
business/la-fi-airbnb-rift-20150404-story.html [http://perma.cc/EG4S-Z3MH]. 
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area rises.53 Second, as more of the City’s tax dollars are spent on 
ensuring the supply of rental housing, less is available for other 
municipal needs.   
The costs generated by home-sharing that are being borne by 
the City of Los Angeles are common throughout several other 
cities in the United States. In response, many cities have 
attempted to regulate home-sharing.54 As discussed infra, the 
effectiveness of such regulation remains to be seen. However, it is 
readily apparent from the regulation efforts that, just like the 
negative externalities home-sharing imposes on single-family 
neighborhoods, the costs that home-sharing imposes on the city 
are also being borne by those who do not participate in 
home-sharing. 
In sum, as home-sharing becomes more widely used 
throughout neighborhoods and cities in the United States, 
negative externalities result, the costs of which fall on 
homeowners in single-family neighborhoods where home-sharing 
is particularly prevalent, and cities where rental housing is in 
short supply. These externalities are substantial, leading 
homeowners to petition local government for the prohibition of 
home-sharing, and compelling cities to devote additional tax 
dollars to maintaining adequate levels of rental housing. Thus, 
the externalities created by home-sharing create a clear demand 
for regulation, and unless regulation can effectively shift the cost 
of those externalities back onto the home-sharing industry, those 
not involved in home-sharing will continue to pay. 
II. INEFFECTIVE REGULATIONS
Given that home-sharing generates substantial negative 
externalities, there is little doubt that the industry needs to be 
regulated. Unsurprisingly, several municipalities have tried. 
However, current attempts at regulation are based on normative 
business-consumer (“B2C”) business models, and as such, these 
regulations target the supplier of services. Thus, current 
regulatory attempts have all targeted those who supply space for 
rent (hosts) rather than the home-sharing websites themselves. 
However, the digital P2P marketplaces utilized by home-sharing 
websites thwart normative regulation methods that are effective 
on traditional commercial enterprises. Digital P2P marketplaces 
reduce the effectiveness of supplier-targeting regulation because 
such regulation is only successful if hosts police themselves, or if 
neighbors blow the whistle. Moreover, neither self-policing nor 
53 Id.
54 Id.
37838-chp_19-2 Sheet No. 134 Side B      05/09/2016   12:16:02
37838-chp_19-2 Sheet No. 134 Side B      05/09/2016   12:16:02
C M
Y K
Do Not Delete 5/6/16 1:57 PM 
608 Chapman Law Review [Vol. 19:2
whistleblowing is occurring because there is little incentive for 
hosts to self-police, there is little opportunity for neighbors to 
whistle-blow, and there are few ways to actually enforce 
regulations even when whistleblowing occurs. Accordingly, nearly 
every attempt to regulate home-sharing, from city-wide to 
neighborhood specific, has failed (with one exception discussed 
infra), leading to the conclusion that a different cost-shifting 
mechanism should be called upon to effectively mitigate the 
negative externalities of home-sharing.   
Airbnb.com and many other home-sharing websites employ a 
P2P marketplace or “platform.”55 These marketplaces “act as a 
meeting point between providers and customers to transact over 
individual services,”56 thereby enabling individuals to monetize 
skills and assets within their possession.57 The concept of a P2P 
marketplace is not new, but thanks to ever-increasing internet 
access and ever-falling utilization costs, companies like Airbnb 
can use the internet to organize and distribute essential market 
information (such as where consumers are, what they will pay, 
whether they can be trusted, etc.) necessary to create a thriving, 
digital, P2P marketplace.58 As the market thrives, the responsible 
website takes a commission of all transactions occurring within 
its digital marketplace. Thus, companies like Airbnb have turned 
P2P platforms into the backbones of their operations: they allow 
users to monetize resources (such as a spare room) at a rate they 
would not be able to before, and for that they take a percentage of 
the revenue.59
While the use of P2P platforms creates resource utilization, 
as stated before, it also creates a challenge from a regulatory 
perspective. Until recently, most large companies operated using 
a B2C platform, which is one commercial producer/provider 
selling goods or providing services to several consumers (like a 
hotel chain and its guests), or business-to-business (“B2B”) 
platform, where companies sell goods to secondary vendors who 
sell the goods directly to the end consumer.60 Such companies can 
be easily regulated because they are the initial and/or sole 
producers of the product or service. Therefore, a regulation that 
targets the producer/provider will be effective because the 
producer/provider is the company, which has complete control 
55 Cheng, supra note 30, at 8. 
56 Id. at 2.
57 Id.
58 Id.
59 James Corbett, The Peer-to-Peer Economy—A Turning Point in Human History,
WALDEN LABS SOLUTIONS IN SELF-RELIANCE (Apr. 8, 2015), http://waldenlabs.com/peer-to-
peer-economy/ [http://perma.cc/82UK-X7J4]. 
60 Cheng, supra note 30, at 9. 
37838-chp_19-2 Sheet No. 135 Side A      05/09/2016   12:16:02
37838-chp_19-2 Sheet No. 135 Side A      05/09/2016   12:16:02
C M
Y K
Do Not Delete 5/6/16 1:57 PM 
2016] The Cost of Sharing and the Common Law 609 
over the product/service. For instance, if a hotel (provider) 
conducts business in a way that generates a nuisance to nearby 
landowners or disrupts a city’s rental housing market, the hotel
will be the target of any necessary regulation. The hotel will then 
comply with the regulation because, as the producer and the 
commercial establishment, its infractions will be visible, reportable, 
and therefore punishable.
Companies that utilize P2P platforms, however, decentralize 
control over their goods and services, and move commercial 
activity into residential homes.61 The company provides the 
general rules for users, but it is the user that provides the actual 
services to consumers, and does so from the privacy of the user’s 
own dwelling.62 In that sense, companies such as Airbnb that 
employ P2P platforms are not the providers of the services 
rendered on its website. Users are not employees or agents of the 
company, but rather are business partners or “micro-
entrepreneurs” making independent business decisions with 
little influence from the company facilitating the transaction.63
Therefore, when regulators seek to impose regulations on 
home-sharing using traditional methods that target the 
producer/provider, the regulations do not target a company like 
Airbnb, but rather target the users of the website, as they are the 
actual providers of the service. However, because the users are 
providing services from their homes, their infractions are far less 
visible than those of a commercial establishment, and thus, 
regulations that target the users of home-sharing websites are 
largely ineffective.  
Currently, the most common forms of home-sharing 
regulations are zoning codes, ordinances, and Homeowner 
Associations’ Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (“CC&Rs”). 
Regardless of whether these regulations existed before the 
advent of home-sharing websites or were enacted as a response, 
they all suffer from the same fatal flaw: they target the user of 
the website and not the website itself. The following hypothetical 
sheds light on the problem. 
Assume Louis Landowner discovers that people in his city 
are making great money by listing their spare rooms on 
Airbnb.com. Landowner decides to investigate, so logs onto 
Airbnb.com and creates a profile. Instantly he is presented with a 
geographically tailored statistic of the average revenue other 
users in his area are generating monthly by listing their 
61 Id. at 8.
62 Id. at 9.
63 Id.
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properties on Airbnb.com. Seeing a lucrative opportunity, 
Landowner lists a spare bedroom in his house on Airbnb.com. He 
heeds the admonition on Airbnb’s website to check his local laws 
and regulations and discovers that his city (like many) has an 
ordinance prohibiting rentals for less than thirty days in 
residential areas.  
Unless Landowner is extremely scrupulous and willing to 
police himself, the ordinance will have no deterring effect 
standing alone. Moreover, even if Landowner is afraid of 
violating prohibitive zoning ordinances, if he types his own 
region and arbitrary dates into Airbnb’s search engine, a map 
will appear, showing all the listings available in his area for 
those dates and their prices. Thus Landowner will see that no 
one is deterred by the ordinance, but rather people are 
generating revenue by violating an ordinance that no one is 
enforcing. Because Landowner is now incentivized not to 
self-police, the prohibitive regulation is ineffective to prevent 
Landowner from engaging in short-term renting. 
Host-based regulations fail not only because there is a lack of 
incentive for the host to self-police, but also because 
home-sharing is hard to detect, making whistleblowing nearly 
impossible. Returning to the hypothetical, suppose Landowner 
has listed a spare bedroom in his home on Airbnb.com for a 
reasonable price. Landowner receives a “request”64 from Gary 
Guest to rent his spare room. Landowner accepts the request and 
a pleasant rental experience follows. Of course, there is no alarm 
sounding informing city officials that Landowner is engaging in a 
prohibited land use. If no one witnesses and reports the activity 
to the city, there cannot even be an attempt at enforcing the 
ordinance. But even assuming a neighbor witnesses guests 
coming and going from Landowner’s home, there is little 
likelihood that such activity would be reported. To a neighbor, 
the individual coming and going could just as likely be a visiting 
friend or family member as an Airbnb guest, so a neighbor is 
unlikely to report a fellow landowner unless there are other 
indications of home-sharing occurring.  
Furthermore, the inability of city officials to investigate alleged 
home-sharers, even once home-sharing has been reported, 
further proves that whistle blowing is an ineffective means of 
regulating home-sharing. Continuing the hypothetical, assume 
64 When an Airbnb guest wants to stay at a listing, they select the listing and click a 
box entitled “request.” Airbnb’s server sends a notification to the owner with the option to 
accept or reject the potential guest. See generally AIRBNB, www.airbnb.com [http://perma.cc/ 
7SKN-YU3X].
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Nathan Neighbor, who lives across the street from Landowner, 
somehow learns that Guest is actually a short-term renter from 
Airbnb.com. He calls the local officials and states that he believes 
Landowner is engaged in a prohibited land use—short-term 
renting. A city official arrives, knocks on Landowner’s door, and 
asks Landowner if he is renting his room short-term to Guest. 
Landowner says “no.” Absent any additional evidence that 
Landowner is renting out his room short-term on Airbnb.com, 
this is likely the end of the investigation.  
For many municipalities and neighborhoods across the 
United States, this hypothetical is not far from what actually 
occurs when anti-home-sharing residents attempt to blow the 
whistle on their neighbors. In Los Angeles for instance, 
short-term rentals violate zoning ordinances and are generally 
subject to fines if discovered,65 yet just as in the 
above-hypothetical, enforcement is scarcely called upon and 
largely ineffective when it is.66 One spokesman from the Building 
Department of Los Angeles stated that “it is extremely difficult to 
prove someone is illegally renting out a home.”67 Upon being 
notified, a building department official could knock on the door of 
the alleged short-term rental location and ask if the owner is 
renting short-term, but if the owner denies it, that is the end of 
the investigation.68 To pursue the matter further, someone from 
the Building Department would need to solicit a search warrant 
from a judge to investigate for “serious violations [of a zoning 
ordinance] that threaten life, limb or property.”69 The unlikelihood 
of seeking and obtaining such a warrant for every alleged 
short-term rental is obvious, and considering the fact that 
thousands of L.A. residents still list their units on Airbnb today, 
it appears home-sharers are aware of the unlikelihood that they 
will be discovered and fined.70 In sum, because home-sharing is 
popular, profitable, and difficult to prove, zoning regulations that 
target users and rely on self-policing and whistleblowing are 
ineffective to actually regulate home-sharing. 
Preexisting user-targeting regulations such as zoning codes 
are not the only regulations that fail to effectuate meaningful 
65 Deputy Director of Planning Alan Bell, Short Term Rentals, EXECUTIVE OFFICES
L.A. DEP’T CITY PLAN. (Mar. 19, 2014), http://cityplanning.lacity.org/code_studies/ 
misc/shortterm rentals.pdf [http://perma.cc/2PNN-RLNK]. 
66 Emily Alpert Reyes, Los Angeles Gives Hosts, Neighbors Mixed Signals on Short-term 
Rentals, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 7, 2015, 10:00 AM), http://www.latimes.com/local/california/la-
me-adv-illegal-rentals-20150208-story.html#page=1 [http://perma.cc/3BZ8-6NA5]. 
67 Id.
68 Id.
69 Id.
70 Samaan, supra note 43. 
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regulation of home-sharing. On the contrary, San Francisco has 
shown that even legislation specifically crafted to regulate 
home-sharing also fails.71 Like Los Angeles, San Francisco has 
experienced a substantial shrinkage of its rental housing market 
as a result of home-sharing.72 Perhaps since San Francisco is 
“ground-zero” for home-sharing (as it is the birthplace of Airbnb 
as well as the location of its headquarters),73 it is one of the first 
cities to pass legislation specifically to address the effects of 
home-sharing on the rental housing market.  
In October 2014, San Francisco’s Board of Supervisors 
approved, and the Mayor signed into law, a bill aimed at 
regulating home-sharing within the city, commonly referred to as 
the “Airbnb Law.”74 David Chiu, President of the Board, stated 
that the law is an attempt at “a balanced solution that protects 
housing from hotel conversion while allowing some flexibility for 
residents to help them afford to stay in their homes.”75 In a 
nutshell, the Airbnb Law legalizes short-term rentals inasmuch 
as they were prohibited by the City’s former zoning code, with 
some caveats:76 only primary residential units (units occupied by 
the permanent resident for at least 275 days out of the year) may 
be listed on home-sharing platforms as short-term rentals; listing 
a property for rent when the host is not present is limited to 
ninety days out of the year; and hosts are required to register 
with the city planning department and obtain a permit in 
71 See Jay Barmann, Airbnb Law Impossible to Enforce, Says Agency Tasked with 
Enforcement, SFIST (Mar. 23, 2015, 4:30 PM), http://sfist.com/2015/03/23/airbnb_law_
impossible_to_enforce_sa.php [http://perma.cc/H82B-UF8Q]; see also Matier & Ross, ‘No 
way of Enforcing’ Airbnb Law, S.F. Planning Memo Says, S.F. CHRON. (Mar. 22, 2015), 
http://www.sfchronicle.com/bayarea/matier-ross/article/No-way-of-enforcing-Airbnb-law-S-
F-planning-6151592.php [http://perma.cc/A5VD-ZWLY]. 
72 See Rachel Swan, Protesters Accuse Airbnb of Desecrating San Francisco’s 
Neighborhoods, S.F. WKLY. (Oct. 27, 2014, 11:25 AM), http://www.sfweekly.com/ 
thesnitch/2014/10/27/protesters-accuse-airbnb-of-killing-san-franciscos-neighborhoods 
[http://perma.cc/7R37-NGFE]; see also Carolyn Said, Window into Airbnb’s Hidden Impact 
on S.F., S.F. CHRON. (June 2014), http://www.sfgate.com/business/ item/Window-into-
Airbnb-s-hidden-impact-on-S-F-30110.php [http://perma.cc/PAK2-LF9C]; Dara Kerr, Sen.
Feinstein Urges San Francisco Not to Pass ‘Airbnb Law’, CNET MAG. (Oct. 20, 2014, 7:28 
PM), http://www.cnet.com/news/sen-feinstein-urges-san-francisco-not-to-pass-airbnb-law/
[http://perma.cc/9V83-JE8Z]. 
73 Lisa Davis, To BnB – or Not?, CAL. LAW. (Nov. 2014), https://ww2.callawyer.com/ 
Clstory.cfm?eid=937933&wteid=937933_To_BnB_-_or_Not? [http://perma. cc/9APZ-VHR9]. 
74 Dara Kerr, Sen. Feinstein Urges San Francisco Not To Pass ‘Airbnb Law’, CNET
MAG. (Oct. 20, 2014, 7:28 PM), http://www.cnet.com/news/sen-feinstein-urges-san-francisco- 
not-to-pass-airbnb-law/ [http://perma.cc/9V83-JE8Z]. 
75 Dara Kerr, San Francisco Mayor Signs Law Making Airbnb Legal, CNET MAG.
(Oct. 28, 2014, 1:25 PM), http://www.cnet.com/news/san-francisco-mayor-makes-airbnb-
law-official/ [http://perma.cc/574A-HHZU]. 
76 Stephen Fishman, Overview of Airbnb Law in San Francisco, NOLO, http:// 
www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/overview-airbnb-law-san-francisco.html [http://perma.cc/5C9U- 
R9SV].
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exchange for a fifty-dollar fee every two years.77 Additionally, the 
Airbnb Law requires that prospective hosts register their activity 
with the City’s Planning Department.78 While at first blush this 
legislation appears promising, upon closer inspection it bears the 
same fatal flaw as zoning ordinances that prohibit short-term 
rentals: it targets users and relies on self-policing and 
whistleblowing to be effective. Unsurprisingly then, since the 
Airbnb Law was enacted, San Francisco residents and city 
officials alike have described it as “a mess.”79
Because the Airbnb Law relies on self-policing, it fails in the 
same fashion as the zoning ordinances that preceded it. For 
home-sharers, the registration process is so cumbersome that 
compliance is difficult and unappealing. The registration process 
mandates that every host interested in listing their property on a 
home-sharing website fill out an application; provide a number of 
documents as proof of permanent residency;80 present a Business 
Registration Certificate to the planning department; present 
proof of liability insurance covering at least $500,000; present a 
signed affidavit agreeing to abide by all conditions of the 
short-term residential rental ordinance; and last but not least, 
present and a fifty-dollar check made out to the San Francisco 
Planning Department.81 Due to the sheer intensity of the 
registration process, the incentive to participate is low, and 
home-sharers are unlikely to police themselves into compliance. 
The fact that only about two percent of home-sharers have even 
attempted to comply with the new regulations suggests that this 
is true. As of March 2015, there were at least 6000 short-term 
rentals operating in San Francisco listed on various home-sharing 
websites (5000 of which were listed on Airbnb.com), and of those 
hosts, only 159 have applied for the mandatory registration.82
The Airbnb Law is further ineffective because, just like with 
ordinances, the entity in charge of enforcement, the San 
Francisco Planning Department, lacks the ability to effectively 
enforce the Law.83 In order to enforce the Airbnb Law, the 
Planning Department would need some way to track and locate 
77 Id.
78 See generally supra Part I; Fishman supra note 76. 
79 Matier & Ross, supra note 71. 
80 Caleb Pershan, Get Ready To Register Your Airbnb and Follow All the New Rules 
Starting Next Month, SFIST (Jan. 19, 2015, 9:50 AM), http://sfist.com/2015/01/19/get_ready_ 
to_register_your_airbnb_w.php [http://perma.cc/CX3P-Q8K6]. 
81 Id.
82 Carolyn Said, S.F. Airbnb Law off to Slow Start; Hosts Say It’s Cumbersome,
SFGATE (Mar. 3, 2015, 1:52 PM), http://www.sfgate.com/business/article/S-F-Airbnb-law-
off-to-slow-start-hosts-say-6110902.php [http://perma.cc/KU38-RGCN]. 
83 Matier & Ross, supra note 71. 
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hosts that are noncompliant. But to do so it would need to be able 
to cross-reference its record of registered hosts with hosts on 
home-sharing websites to discover the identities and locations of 
non-register hosts. The only entity capable of accurately 
collecting and reviewing the names and locations of all hosts on 
its website are the home-sharing websites themselves, but for the 
time being, they do not cooperate with city officials.84
Additionally, the Planning Department claims it would need 
home-sharing companies to monitor their sites and actually 
prohibit users from accepting more than ninety days worth of 
guest requests for rentals in multi-dwelling buildings in San 
Francisco, 85 but home-sharing websites decline to do this as well. 
Given that the San Francisco Planning Department needs 
meaningful cooperation from home-sharing websites to effectively 
enforce the new Airbnb Law, without such cooperation, the law is 
just as impotent as the preexisting zoning code it was designed to 
replace.86
The problems of self-policing and whistleblowing that 
frustrate the effectiveness of city-enacted regulations also 
prevent regulation of home-sharing on a smaller scale. 
Homeowners Associations (“HOAs”), with few exceptions, are 
equally incapable of regulating home-sharing as municipalities 
because, just like municipalities, HOA regulations target users of 
home-sharing websites. As demonstrated above, when a 
regulation targets users, its success is tied to the users’ 
willingness to self-police or third parties’ ability to blow the 
whistle. While the smaller size of an HOA compared to a 
municipality can reduce some barriers to enforcement, for the 
most part, HOA regulations targeting home-sharing still fail. 
When a landowner purchases property governed by an HOA, 
he agrees to abide by the CC&Rs. A common restriction in 
CC&Rs is a prohibition on short-term renting; thus most HOAs 
make it a finable offense for one of its members to rent space in 
their properties for less than thirty days. But still, the target of 
the regulation is the host, and just like zoning ordinances or 
specially crafted legislation, the regulation relies on self-policing 
and whistle-blowing. Accordingly, before any regulation can 
occur, a neighbor must report the offending property owner and 
an HOA official must actually investigate the claim. The size of 
neighborhoods compared to the size of cities gives HOAs an 
advantage in that the HOA has fewer properties to police than a 
84 Id.
85 Id. at 2.
86 Id.
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municipality, but generally speaking, that advantage is still 
insufficient to overcome inherent problems with user-based 
regulations. However, a minority of HOAs have demonstrated 
that with the right infrastructure and extreme vigilance, they 
can overcome the barriers to whistleblowing and enforce their 
prohibitions on home-sharing to some degree. Take for example, 
the case of The Mark Condominium Association in downtown 
San Diego.87
Thomas Stevens lived in a condo in a high-rise run by The 
Mark Condominium Association in downtown San Diego.88 At the 
time Stevens bought his condo, he agreed to the CC&Rs (as is 
always a condition of purchasing a dwelling controlled by an 
HOA).89 The CC&Rs of the condominium prohibited rentals of 
less than 90 days,90 yet Stevens, either in ignorance or disregard 
of the prohibition, decided to list his condo on a home-sharing 
website.91 Stevens was eventually discovered by his HOA when 
one of his guests revealed to a receptionist at the building that 
she was a short-term renter.92 The HOA then fined Stevens 
$350.93 Apparently this was but a slap on the wrist to Stevens, 
who reportedly pocketed $2,500 from the week-long rental which 
resulted in the fine.94 Perhaps Stevens continued to somehow 
remain ignorant of the specifics of the CC&Rs after his fine, or 
perhaps simple math (Stevens’ large profit margin despite the 
fine) is a better explanation for why Stevens continued to list his 
condo on home-sharing websites. However, Stevens was eventually 
sued by The Mark.95 Initially, Steven tried what many 
home-sharers are likely to do—he claimed his guests were 
friends or family members, but to no avail.96 While the frequency 
of Stevens’ rental activities were disputed in litigation, a 
Superior Court Judge ultimately found for The Mark, and 
concluded that Stevens was in breach of his contract (the 
CC&Rs) with The Mark.97 The court awarded the condominium 
87 Jonathan Horn, Man Who Rented out Condo Fined $106K, U-T SAN DIEGO (Oct. 
24, 2014, 4:55 PM), http://www.utsandiego.com/news/2014/oct/24/airbnb-vrbo-mark-rent-
steelers-gaslamp-condos/?#article-copy [http://perma.cc/G6P7-9GGC]. 
88 Id.
89 Id.
90 Id.
91 Id.
92 Id.
93 Id.
94 Id.
95 Id.; see also Ariel Bedell, Short-Term Vacation Rentals and Homeowners 
Associations (HOAs), LOFTIN FIRM, P.C. (Nov. 3, 2014), http://www.loftinfirm.com/blog/ 
2014/11/short-term-vacation-rentals-and-homeowners-associations-hoas.shtml [http://perma.cc/ 
C6BL-2Q49]. 
96 Horn, supra note 87. 
97 Id.
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roughly $16,000 in costs, and $90,000 in attorneys’ fees for breach of 
contract.98 If the math was not simple before, it certainly is now: 
Stevens’ home-sharing activities earned him a few thousand 
dollars, but in the end it cost him over a hundred thousand, and 
Stevens had to sell his condo to pay for the ordeal.99
While Stevens’ story may be a cautionary tale for some 
home-sharers, it is unlikely to deter the majority of homeowners 
from home-sharing because there are two characteristics of The 
Mark that are unique to high-rise style HOAs that make 
enforcement of anti-home-sharing regulations possible. The first 
characteristic is the dense, vertical layout of a condominium style 
HOA. As one general manager of a high-rise condominium 
pointed out, “you’re not going to keep anything secret in a 
vertical village.”100 First, management is likely to be working in 
the lobby for several hours a day and is likely to take notice of 
any unusual increase in new faces or non-residents coming and 
going with luggage. Second, the residents all use the same 
parking structure, elevators, hallways, lobby, and common-areas, 
making it much easier for whistleblowing neighbors to be aware 
of short-term guests coming and going than in typical low density 
residential areas. 
The second characteristic unique to condominium-style 
HOAs is the apartment-like management system. Unlike typical 
HOAs, which are policed by a board of elected, volunteer 
homeowners, high-rise condominium HOAs like The Mark are 
policed by paid managerial staff.101 Since they are paid to keep 
the condominium functioning smoothly for all members, 
condominium managers have the time and motivation to 
vigilantly watch for activities such as home-sharing that 
threaten the quiet enjoyment (and thereby the value) of the 
condos. A general manager of one condominium complex in 
downtown San Diego stated he “checks sites like Airbnb every 
two weeks to see if people are advertising their units,” and 
checks those websites even more frequently during times of 
increased tourism in the city.102 Unlike these downtown high-rise 
condominiums, most neighborhood HOAs are not patrolled by 
paid managerial staff, and thus they are unable to go to such 
lengths to investigate for home-sharing.   
98 Id.
99 Id.
100 Id.
101 Id.
102 Id.
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While the HOA of a high-rise condominium complex may be 
in an advantageous position to weed out short-term rentals, they 
are the exception. Neither of the two characteristics that 
overcome enforcement difficulties are found in typical, sprawling, 
single-family-home style HOAs. Unlike The Mark and similarly 
situated HOAs, most HOAs are still barred from enforcing 
anti-home-sharing regulations by a lack of self-policing and 
whistleblowing.  
Whether the regulation of home-sharing is citywide or 
neighborhood specific, if such a regulation targets hosts, it is 
unlikely to be effective. The majority of cities and HOAs do not 
have the resources or ability to monitor hosts regularly, and 
neither do neighbors. Because there is no enforcement, and the 
potential for revenue is great, users are not incentivized to 
self-police. Therefore, regulatory attempts thus far have resulted 
in little to no change in the home-sharing industry; the costs of 
the negative externalities are still fully borne by those outside of 
the industry. This epic failure of legislative regulation suggests 
that another cost-shifting tool is needed to address the negative 
externalities generated by the proliferation of home-sharing 
across the United States. 
III. USING NUISANCE LAW TO TARGET WEBSITES AND 
EFFECTIVELY REGULATE HOME-SHARING
As discussed above, home-sharing generates substantial 
negative externalities, the cost of which are currently borne by 
individuals and entities who do not participate in home-sharing. 
Meanwhile, the P2P nature of the home-sharing industry 
frustrates traditional methods of regulatory enforcement, making 
regulatory attempts to mitigate the negative impacts ineffective. 
But where regulations fail, the common law can succeed. Recent 
case law regarding digital P2P platforms shows that common law 
rules of fault-based liability can be used to hold the creators of 
P2P platforms liable for the damages caused by third parties 
using their platforms.103 Thus the common law acts as a 
cost-shifting mechanism for negative externalities: when a 
company generates substantial negative externalities, if the 
company is found liable, it must pay the damages—i.e. the cost of 
the negative externalities. Furthermore, once liability has been 
established, the company will be compelled to implement new 
business methods that insulate the company from liability. In 
other words, the company will stop producing negative 
103 See generally A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001); 
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005). 
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externalities, or else it will pay the cost of them in court.  
Therefore, in the event that legislative action fails to regulate an 
industry, the common law can be used to shift the costs of the 
negative externalities caused by home-sharing away from the 
general public and onto the cost-generating industry.  
The cases of A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc. and 
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd. provide the 
framework for applying rules of fault-based liability to digital 
P2P platforms. In 1999, Napster, Inc. created a P2P platform 
that allowed users to share music, and in 2001, Grokster, Ltd. 
created a P2P platform that allowed users to share music and 
movies.104 The practices of music sharing and movie sharing caused 
a negative externality—wide-spread copyright infringement—and 
for a time the cost of the externality (lost profits) was borne by 
music and movie producers. However, once these companies were 
taken to court, the cost of copyright infringement was shifted 
from music and movie producers onto Napster and Grokster 
respectively.
In 1999, Shawn Fanning developed one of the first digital 
P2P platforms, Napster, Inc.—a file-sharing service that made it 
fast and simple for users to share music over the Internet.105
With the help of a few programmers, Fanning launched his 
software and incorporated Napster, Inc.106 Within months, user 
numbers skyrocketed, billions of songs were being shared, and 
Napster generated substantial revenue through venture 
capitalists’ investments. Unfortunately for Napster, however, the 
negative externalities generated from music sharing were 
substantial enough to compel those affected by them to take 
action,107 and less than a year after its creation Napster, Inc. was 
sued by the RIAA (Recording Industry Association of America) 
for copyright infringement.108
At the trial court level, Napster was enjoined from operating 
based on claims of copyright infringement.109 Eventually 
appearing before the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals,110 Napster 
defended its liability by citing Sony Corp. of America v. Universal 
City Studios, Inc., a case in which Sony was sued for its sale of 
104 Richard Nieva, Ashes to Ashes, Peer to Peer: An Oral History of Napster, FORTUNE
MAG. (Sept. 5, 2013, 9:00 AM), http://fortune.com/2013/09/05/ashes-to-ashes-peer-to-peer-
an-oral-history-of-napster/ [http://perma.cc/8F5L-7L3E]; see also Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 
at 919. 
105 Nieva, supra note 104. 
106 Id.
107 Id.
108 Id.
109 Id.
110 Id.
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Videocassette Recorders (“VCRs”).111 To give a brief history, when 
VCRs became available to the general public, several copyright 
owners of television programs sued Sony for copyright 
infringement, arguing that by distributing a product that allows 
consumers to record and re-watch television programs, Sony was 
contributorily infringing on their copyrights.112 Simply put, the 
Supreme Court of the United States ruled that because the VCR 
was equally capable of being used by consumers for noninfringing 
purposes, sales of VCRs to the public did not constitute 
contributory infringement of copyrights.113
The Ninth Circuit distinguished Napster’s software from the 
VCR, pointing out the VCR “did not distribute taped television 
broadcasts,” but rather merely allowed users to watch them at a 
different time, whereas the technological process of Napster’s 
software actually involved duplicating and subsequently 
distributing copyrighted material to the general public.114 The 
Ninth Circuit ultimately upheld a modified injunctive order and 
mandated Napster remove all infringing material from its 
servers.115 By 2002, Napster ceased doing business as a 
music-sharing company,116 however, the company since has been 
bought and now conducts legitimate business as Rhapsody. Thus 
in the end, the judicial system was able to shift the cost of the 
negative externalities caused by file-sharing back on the 
company that controlled the practice, and the company then 
found a business practice that eliminated those externalities. 
Though Napster was the first company to use digital P2P 
platforms with disregard for the negative impacts on third 
parties, they were far from the last. Grokster, Ltd., emerged on 
the heels of Napster in 2001, and like Napster, Grokster used a 
P2P platform to enable users to exchange not only music, but 
movie files as well.117 Grokster was nearly identical to Napster in 
purpose—allowing users to freely share movies and music files 
over the Internet—but Grokster employed an essential 
“technological tweak” that distinguished itself from the 
music-sharing pioneer from a liability perspective.118 Napster’s 
111 See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1019 (9th Cir. 2001). 
112 See generally Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 
(1984).
113 Id. at 455. 
114 See Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d at 1010. 
115 Id.
116 Id.
117 David McGuire, At a Glance: MGM v. Grokster, WASH. POST (June 27, 2005, 
12:37 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/05/03/AR200505 
0301028.html [http://perma.cc/AYH6-TPAN]; see also Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. 
v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 923 (2005). 
118 McGuire, supra note 117. 
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software allowed users to search through each other’s computers 
and share copyrighted music with one another, but in the 
process, each music file shared would pass through Napster’s 
servers electronically. In the eyes of the Ninth Circuit, this gave 
Napster a degree of control over copyrighted material after it was 
sent from a sender and before it arrived on the receiver’s 
computer. This control was a significant factor in finding Napster 
liable for contributory copyright infringement.119 However, 
Grokster’s software “abandoned centralized servers, allowing 
users to connect directly with each other.”120 So unlike Napster, 
Grokster maintained no control over the files being sent using its 
software and therefore believed it could not be viewed as the 
distributor of copyrighted material and would not be held liable 
for copyright infringement as Napster was. 
This belief was in fact shared by the District Court for the 
Central District of California when Grokster was eventually sued 
by a number of copyright holders claiming that Grokster 
“knowingly and intentionally distributed their software to enable 
users to reproduce and distribute the copyrighted works.”121 The 
District Court held that since Grokster retained no control over 
the activities of its users, and because the file-sharing software 
could be used for noninfringing purposes, it was protected from 
liability based on the Supreme Court’s ruling in the Sony case.122
The case was ultimately appealed to the United States 
Supreme Court, which granted certiorari and reversed the 
rulings of the District Court and Court of Appeals, finding 
Grokster liable for contributory copyright infringement.123 One of 
the many factors that led the Court to its decision included the 
fact that Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer (“MGM”) had “commissioned a 
statistician to conduct a systematic search [using Grokster’s 
software], and his study showed that nearly 90% of the files 
available for download on [Grokster’s network] were copyrighted 
works.”124 Additionally, Grokster conceded its awareness that 
users typically employed its software primarily to download 
copyrighted files, since MGM had previously notified Grokster of 
roughly eight million copyrighted files that could be obtained 
using its software.125 Discovery also showed that Grokster 
adamantly promoted and marketed itself as software that 
119 Id.
120 Id.
121 See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc., 545 U.S. at 921. 
122 McGuire, supra note 117.
123 See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc., 545 U.S. at 919. 
124 Id. at 922. 
125 Id. at 923. 
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enables users to download copyrighted works, and Grokster made 
no effort to filter copyrighted material from the network or 
otherwise prohibit the sharing of copyrighted files.126 The Court 
found that overall, the facts indicated that Grokster was not a 
mere passive creator of a digital P2P platform that allowed for 
possible infringement, but rather, it had “clearly voiced the 
objective that recipients use it to download copyrighted works.”127
Despite these findings, Grokster attempted to argue that 
“because it was the users themselves who searched for, retrieved, 
and stored the infringing files,” Grokster was like Sony and could 
not be said to have materially contributed to its user’s copyright 
infringement.128 The Court disagreed, stating that the lower 
courts misinterpreted the Sony rule to mean “that whenever a 
product is capable of substantial lawful use, the producer can 
never be held contributorily liable for third parties’ infringing use 
of it.”129 Rather, the Court clarified that “nothing in Sony
requires courts to ignore evidence of intent if there is such 
evidence, and the case was never meant to foreclose rules of 
fault-based liability derived from the common law.”130
Ultimately, because Grokster “showed itself to be aiming to 
satisfy a known source of demand for copyright infringement,” 
Grokster never “attempted to develop filter tools or other 
mechanisms to diminish the infringing activity,” and “the 
commercial sense” of Grokster’s enterprise turned on 
high-volume infringing use, the Court could infer Grokster’s 
intent to induce and encourage its user to directly infringe on the 
plaintiff’s copyrights, and concluded by stating that Grokster’s 
“unlawful objective [was] unmistakable.”131
The Supreme Court’s decision in Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer can 
be applied to home-sharing to the extent that it provides a 
frame-work for analyzing the liability of P2P platform creators. 
Although Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer revolved around a copyright 
dispute, the Supreme Court’s decision was based on “rules of 
fault-based liability derived from the common law” that go 
beyond copyright law.132 Thus, through Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer,
the Supreme Court iterated a general rule (“the MGM rule”) 
regarding P2P networks: when a cause of action can establish 
third-party liability, the fact that a P2P platform is capable of 
126 Id. at 926. 
127 Id. at 924. 
128 Id. at 928. 
129 Id. at 934. 
130 Id. at 934–35. 
131 Id. at 939–40. 
132 Id. at 934–35. 
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lawful use, standing alone, will not shield the creator of the 
platform from liability. If the P2P platform’s primary intent is to 
facilitate unlawful activity, the party who creates and has the 
power to regulate the platform can be held liable based on a 
common law cause of action for the damages caused by 
third-party use of the platform. Since home-sharing websites are 
similar to Grokster in that they create and have the power to 
regulate their P2P networks, the rule from Grokster can be 
applied to analyze whether home-sharing websites can be liable 
for the negative externalities caused by third-parties activities on 
their websites. 
By combining the MGM rule with nuisance law, 
home-sharing websites can conceivably be held liable for 
damages caused by the unlawful activity of third parties using 
their platforms. Like the common law cause of action for 
contributory copyright infringement, the common law cause of 
action for private nuisance allows a plaintiff to hold a defendant 
liable for the unlawful acts of third parties. Before 
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, a home-sharing website may have been 
able to claim that because its P2P platform is equally capable of 
lawful use, it could not be liable for a claim of private nuisance. 
However, after Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, the fact that a P2P 
platform is capable of lawful use is not a bar to a plaintiff’s 
recovery from a defendant for third-party torts, when the action 
is based on a common law cause of action. If a plaintiff can show 
that the primary intent of a home-sharing P2P platform is to 
facilitate unlawful home-sharing, the home-sharing website itself 
could be held liable for the damages caused by the unlawful 
home-sharing of third-parties. 
As stated by the Supreme Court of California, liability for 
private nuisance arises when a plaintiff can establish 
“interference with the plaintiff’s use and enjoyment” of their 
property.133 And while the law recognizes that “[l]ife in organized 
society . . . involves an unavoidable clash of individual interests,” 
the law will also recognize “liability for damages . . . in those 
cases in which the harm or risk to one is greater than he ought to 
be required to bear under the circumstances.”134 Furthermore, 
the Restatement of Torts, Second, provides that “the fact that 
other persons contributes to the nuisance is not a bar to the 
defendant’s liability,”135 and “one is subject to liability for a 
nuisance caused by an activity, not only when he carries on the 
133 San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. Superior Court, 920 P.2d 669, 696 (Cal. 1996). 
134 Id.
135 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 840(e) (AM. LAW INST. 2006).
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activity but also when he participates to a substantial extent in 
carrying it on.”136
Given that courts across the U.S. have enunciated the 
well-established tenet of private nuisance law, which states that 
a defendant can be held liable for contributing to the nuisance, 
assisting in the creation of nuisance,137 controlling that which 
creates the nuisance,138 participating in the nuisance,139 and even 
instructing others to create a nuisance,140  it cannot be gainsaid 
that nuisance law allows for a plaintiff to recover from a 
defendant for the tortious actions of third-parties—much like the 
laws of copyright expounded upon by the Supreme Court in 
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer. Accordingly, if a plaintiff can establish all 
of the elements of private nuisance, under the MGM rule, that 
plaintiff may be able to not only bring a cause of action against a 
home-sharing company for private nuisance, but actually recover 
damages for the nuisances caused by third-parties—the users.  
To establish a prima facie case for private nuisance, a 
plaintiff must establish: (1) the defendant committed an act;141
(2) the act was a substantial invasion of the plaintiff’s interest in 
the private use or enjoyment of his land;142 and (3) the invasion 
was unreasonable under the circumstances of the particular 
case.143 Analyzing each of these elements in turn reveals that if a 
class of landowners become so inclined—conceivably motivated 
by the perpetual nuisances of short-term rentals in their 
neighborhoods—they could establish a prima facie showing of 
private nuisance against a home-sharing website like Airbnb.com.  
136 Id. § 834; see also Cty. of Santa Clara v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 40 Cal. Rptr. 3d 
313, 325 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006) (stating “liability for nuisance does not hinge on whether the 
defendant owns, possesses or controls the property, nor on whether he is in a position to 
abate the nuisance; the critical question is whether the defendant created or assisted in 
the creation of the nuisance”) (quoting City of Modesto Redevelopment Agency v. Superior 
Court, 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d 865, 872 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004), as modified on denial of reh’g (June 
28, 2004)). 
137 Cty. of Santa Clara, 40 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 325; Shurpin v. Elmhirst, 195 Cal. Rptr. 
737, 740–41 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983). 
138 City of Greenwood v. Martin Marietta Materials, Inc., 299 S.W.3d 606, 621 (Mo. 
Ct. App. 2009); Rosenfeld v. Thoele, 28 S.W.3d 446, 452 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000).
139 Abbatiello v. Monsanto Co., 522 F. Supp.2d 524, 541 (S.D.N.Y. 2007); see also
Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. Singer Warehouse & Trucking Corp., 447 N.Y.S.2d 265, 266 
(N.Y. App. Div. 1982). 
140 California Dept. of Toxic Substances Control v. Payless Cleaners, College 
Cleaners, 368 F.Supp 2d. 1069, 1081 (E.D. Cal. 2005) (stating “[n]uisance liability also 
extends to defendants who create ‘a system that causes hazardous wastes to be disposed 
of improperly, or who instruct users’ to do so”) (citing Selma Pressure Treating Co. 
v. Osmose Wood Preserving Co., 271 Cal. Rptr. 596 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990)). 
141 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 824. 
142 San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. Superior Court, 920 P.2d 669, 696 (Cal. 1996); 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 822. 
143 San Diego Gas & Electric Co., 920 P.2d at 696; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 822 comment (c). 
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First, the class could assert that Airbnb participated to a 
substantial extent in the act of home-sharing by creating a P2P 
platform that instructs and allows third-parties (users) to list 
their properties for rent short term. While the act of unlawful 
home-sharing is directly done by the third-party that lists their 
property for rent on Airbnb.com, as stated above, the laws of 
private nuisance state that one who substantially contributes to 
an unreasonable invasion can also be held liable. Thus, the fact 
that Airbnb.com is not the party listing the property for rent 
unlawfully would not defeat the assertion that Airbnb.com has 
committed an act for the purposes of making a prima facie 
showing of private nuisance. 
Second, the class could establish that Airbnb’s act of 
instructing and allowing users to create short-term rentals was a 
substantial invasion of their respective interests in the private 
use and enjoyment of land by pointing to the negative 
externalities caused by home-sharing on residential neighborhoods. 
For instance, if the plaintiff class included residents of Silver 
Lake, Los Angeles, the class could point to the increased traffic, 
noise, transients, and subsequent effects on property values of 
the neighborhood, as facts sufficient to establish that, by enabling 
unlawful home-sharing, Airbnb has substantially invaded their 
interest in the private use and enjoyment of their land. 
The last hurdle the plaintiff-class would have to leap over 
would be the establishment of Airbnb’s invasion of their interests 
as unreasonable.144 When determining whether an invasion of an 
interest is unreasonable, courts consider “whether the gravity of 
the harm outweighs the social utility of the defendant’s 
conduct.”145 As is apparent from the language, this test is a 
fact-based inquiry, and in general, is “to be determined by the 
trier of fact in each case.”146 Conceivably then, a class of 
landowners could succeed in establishing Airbnb’s invasion as 
unreasonable by making an offer of proof as to the aggregate 
monetary diminishment of properties owned by members of the 
class as a result of home-sharing facilitated by Airbnb, and by 
offering objective, fact-based reports that show the negative 
impact of unregulated home-sharing on the cost of living in dense 
areas. The diminishment of property values would speak to the 
gravity of harm caused by Airbnb, while the reports of Airbnb’s 
negative impact on cost of living in dense areas would point out a 
lack of social utility in Airbnb’s actions.   
144 San Diego Gas & Electric Co., 920 P.2d at 696. 
145 Id. at 697. 
146 Id.
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Because the common-law tort of nuisance allows for certain 
contributors to the nuisance to be held liable for the 
unreasonable invasions of third-parties, if a plaintiff class is one 
day successful in pleading all the elements of private nuisance, 
the plaintiff class could then argue that the MGM rule should be 
applied, for just like Napster and Grokster, Airbnb is the creator 
of a P2P network that results in tortious action. Accordingly, a 
court will then be able to consider whether the same factors of 
fault-based liability that led to Grokster being held liable in 
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer are present in home-sharing companies 
like Airbnb. 
Under the MGM rule in Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, the Court 
concluded that Grokster could be held liable for torts of 
third-parties using its platform because its primary intent was to 
facilitate unlawful activity. The Court reached this conclusion by 
finding that three factors were present: (1) Grokster was aiming 
to satisfy a demand for unlawful activity (copyright infringement); 
(2) Grokster did not attempt to reduce the amount of unlawful 
activity that took place in its network; and (3) the more activity 
that took place on Grokster’s network, the more profitable the 
company became, and most of the activity was unlawful. Thus if 
the same three factors can be proven of a home-sharing website 
such as Airbnb, like Grokster, that home-sharing website could 
be held liable for the torts of third-parties using its platform.  
To continue to use Airbnb as an example, a plaintiff class of 
landowners could make a strong argument that the second two 
factors that gave rise to the fault-based liability of Grokster’s 
P2P network under the MGM rule are present in Airbnb’s P2P 
network as well. First, Airbnb does not attempt to reduce the 
amount of unlawful activity taking place on its network. Airbnb 
knows or has reason to know that home-sharing is prohibited in 
several areas, but yet Airbnb makes no substantial effort to limit 
its potential to be used by people living in those areas. For 
example, if Airbnb so desired, it could prohibit users from posting 
a short-term rental located in places like The Mark Condominiums, 
or prohibit users from listing properties in violation of San 
Francisco’s Airbnb Law, but it does not. Thus, by continuing to 
make its platform available to all landowners everywhere, 
without limitation, Airbnb is declining to reduce the amount of 
unlawful activity taking place on its network.  
It could be argued that because Airbnb has content on its 
website encouraging users to consult their leases, HOAs, and 
local regulatory agencies, it does in fact attempt to limit the 
amount of unlawful activity taking place on its website. However, 
the content can only be found by clicking on a small link titled 
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“FAQs for Housing” at the very bottom of Airbnb’s webpage, 
while the words “List Your Property” appear in large, colorful 
font in the center of the page.147 Furthermore, at no point in the 
listing process is the user re-directed to the page with the content 
that encourages hosts to check with the various regulatory 
entities.148 In light of these circumstances, the fact that Airbnb 
warns users to check with local regulations may carry little 
weight. Therefore, a class would most likely still be able to 
establish that Airbnb does not limit the amount of unlawful 
activity on its website, despite the fact that at some point it 
encourages users to check local regulations. 
Second, a plaintiff class could assert that, like Grokster, the 
more activity that takes place on Airbnb’s network, the more 
profitable it becomes, since Airbnb takes a commission from 
every transaction occurring on its website. Furthermore, after 
propounding extensive discovery, the class would also likely be 
able to assert that the majority of short-term listings on Airbnb’s 
website are unlawful in one way or another (violative of city 
ordinance, HOA regulation, lease agreement, etc.), for as discussed 
supra, there were nearly 5000 unlawful units listed on Airbnb in 
March 2015 in San Francisco alone.149 Indeed, the plaintiffs in 
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, were able to establish the majority of the 
activity taking place on Grokster’s network was illegal by hiring 
a statistician to determine the percentage of file downloads on 
Grokster’s network that were copyrighted files. Perhaps the 
future class could even hire the same statistician. Thus, with the 
help of a detailed investigation, a plaintiff asserting a claim of 
private nuisance could establish that, like Grokster, the more 
activity that occurs on Airbnb’s network, the more profitable it 
becomes, and most of the activity is unlawful.  
The biggest challenge for a class of landowners using the 
MGM rule to assert a claim of private nuisance against a 
home-sharing company like Airbnb would be to establish that, 
like Grokster, Airbnb is aiming to satisfy a demand for unlawful 
activity. Though not impossible, the success of that argument 
would depend on whether the class can establish that despite 
Airbnb’s efforts to encourage users to check with local laws and 
regulations, Airbnb is still encouraging users in restricted areas 
to list their properties for rent on Airbnb.com. The class may be 
able to succeed if it can show that Airbnb still targets restricted 
home-owners through its marketing campaigns. Accordingly, if a 
147 See generally AIRBNB, supra note 64. 
148 Id.
149 Said, supra note 82. 
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plaintiff can show that Airbnb solicits and induces homeowners 
or lessees to violate regulations and list their properties on 
Airbnb.com, a plaintiff could establish that, like Grokster, Airbnb 
is aiming to satisfy a demand for unlawful activity.  
In sum, because the common law tort of private nuisance can 
be used to hold a defendant liable for the torts of third-parties, 
using the MGM rule, a court could find Airbnb liable for private 
nuisance. Under the MGM rule, the mere fact that Airbnb can be 
used for lawful activity does not bar defendants from recovery. 
Airbnb created the platform, and has the power to regulate it. 
Thus if a court determines all the elements of private nuisance 
are met and the primary purpose of Airbnb’s P2P network is to 
facilitate unlawful activity, a court could hold Airbnb liable for 
the damages caused by the users of its website.  
CONCLUSION
Home-sharing is a rapidly growing new industry that 
provides for utilization of an often unused resource (space), but 
the negative externalities that result are numerous and 
substantial. In communities where home-sharing is prevalent, 
landowners experience invasions of their property interests 
typically associated with commercial activities. Meanwhile, the 
cost of living for the city as a whole rises, as units of rental 
housing are converted into permanent short-term rentals, 
reducing the overall supply and driving the price of those 
remaining units upward. Because the costs of these externalities 
are currently borne by those outside the home-sharing industry 
there is a demand for regulation, but due to challenges presented 
by digital P2P platforms, regulatory methods both new and old 
that are designed to address such externalities fail to shift the 
costs of the negative externalities onto the home-sharing 
industry. However, where legislative regulations fail, the 
common law can succeed. Once aggregate damages reach a 
tipping point, a plaintiff class of landowners may bring a lawsuit 
for private nuisance against home-sharing companies 
themselves, and using the rule of P2P platform liability stated by 
the U.S. Supreme Court in Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, that class may 
just prevail. If so, the defendant home-sharing website will be 
forced to account for the negative externalities caused by the 
industry, or cease to do business in the manner in which they 
currently operate. As such, the common law will have provided 
the mechanism for shifting the costs of home-sharing back to the 
industry.  
